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MILITARY APPELLATE DECISIONS FOLLOWING
O'CALLAHAN v. PARKER
MYRON L. BIRNBAUM* AND CHARLES W. FOWLER**
I. INTRODUCTION'T HE decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in O'Callahan
v. Parker,' handed down on June 2, 1969, compelled a fundamental
change in prevailing concepts of court-martial jurisdiction. The decades
previous had been marked by a growing tendency for military tribunals,
often with the active concurrence of local jurisdictions, to try all military
offenders for all classes of offenses. This was sometimes pithily expressed
within the services as the military's "washing its own dirty linen."
Some degree of Congressional support for this exercise of jurisdiction
may be seen in the 1950 reenactment 3 of the then current basic military
justice statutes4 into the new Uniform Code of Military Justice.' Article
5 states that the Code applies "in all places."' Among the Punitive Ar-
ticles which define the offenses covered by the Code, Articles 116 through
132? define essentially common law offenses from breach of the peace
through the common felonies to rape and murder, while the restatement
of the General Article declared court-martial jurisdiction over unspecified
offenses in the broadest language yet used:
[A]ll disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed
forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes
and offenses not capital .... 8
* Colonel, Judge Advocate General's Department, United States Air Force; member
of the California Bar.
** Major, Judge Advocate General's Department, United States Air Force; member of
the Maryland Bar. The authors' opinions, as expressed in this article, are their own and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Judge Advocate General's Department of the
Air Force.
1. At the outset, the authors invite attention to the scholarly article by Professor Grant
S. Nelson, University of Michigan, and Professor James E. Westbrook, University of Mis-
souri-Columbia, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Servicemen for "Civilian" Offenses: An
Analysis of O'Callahan v. Parker, 54 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1969). That article deals brilliantly
and in depth with the background and content of the decision itself, matters not covered
in the present discussion. We also desire to express appreciation to Major Robert L. Bates,
Associate Appellate Government Counsel, USAF judiciary, for editorial and research assis-
tance.
2. 395 US. 258 (1969).
3. Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107.
4. For the Army and the Air Force, the Articles of War; for the Navy, the Articles for
the Government of the Navy.
5. The Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter cited as UCMJ] is codified at
10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964), as amended, 10 U.S.C. §§ 810-940 (Supp. IV, 1969).
6. UCMJ art. 5, 10 U.S.C. § 80S (1964).
7. UCMJ arts. 116-32, 10 U.S.C. §§ 916-32 (1964).
8. UCMJ art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964).
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In O'Callahan, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for a 5-to-3 majority of
the Court, examined this broad exercise of military jurisdiction. After a
wide ranging, sometimes disparaging chronicle of military justice history,
precedents, and practice, he held that-at least in peacetime-courts-
martial have jurisdiction only over "service-connected" offenses.'
O'Callahan, an Army sergeant, had been stationed in Hawaii and on
leave in 1956, the time of the offense. He had been convicted by a general
court-martial of the crimes of attempted rape, housebreaking, and assault
with intent to rape.10 The appellate procedures under the Code had been
completed and the case had become "final" in the sense of Article 76.11
In holding that the offenses were not service-connected, the author
Justice did not attempt to set forth any compendium of rules for use as
a touchstone in determining whether an offense is service-connected.
Instead, he spoke in terms of the instant crimes and offender, making a
number of points which may be conveniently restated as follows:
1. O'Callahan was on leave when the crimes were committed.
2. The crimes were not connected with his military duties.
3. The crimes were not committed on a military post or enclave.
4. The victim was not performing duties related to the military.
5. Hawaii was not "an armed camp under military control."
6. It was peacetime, not involving war power authority.
7. Civil courts were open.
8. The offenses were in United States territory, "not in the occupied
zone of a foreign country."
9. The offenses did not involve flouting of military authority, security
of a military post, or integrity of military property."
The military justice system responded immediately to the decision.
Electrical messages went to the field and an unreported and unknown
number of prosecutions of non-service-connected offenses were dropped
and convictions under initial review were reversed. At the appellate level,
the service Boards of Review' 3 and the United States Court of Military
Appeals immediately extended their review of the cases before them to
the question introduced by O'Callakan.
The problem which the decision gave the military practitioner at the
outset was the definition of "service-connected" and how to apply it as a
9. 395 U.S. at 272.
10. Id. at 260-61, in violation of UCMJ arts. 80, 130, 134, 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 930, 934
(1964).
11. UCMJ art. 76, 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1964).
12. 395 U.S. at 273-74.
13. Then the intermediate military appellate tribunal, now reconstituted as Military
Courts of Review under the Military Justice Act of 1968, UCMJ art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866
(Supp. IV, 1969).
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test for jurisdiction. Would a reversal of the O'Calialan pattern in any
one of the criteria enumerated above provide a basis for trial by court-
martial? And were these the only criteria, or were there other possibilities
not mentioned in the decision?
The Court of Military Appeals issued its first definitive decision on the
question in early September in United States v. Borys" and, during the
ensuing months, has established a body of case law which maps the
greater part of the territory into service-connected and non-service-con-
nected areas. At the date of the present writing, the views of this highest
service court have been well enough enunciated that the military lawyer
may once again approach most offenses with a clear idea of whether the
court will find jurisdiction.
Two fundamental questions remain to be answered by the Supreme
Court. First, is O'Callahan retroactive as to cases which were final at
the date of its promulgation? The Supreme Court, on February 27, 1970,
granted certiorari in one case, Relford v. Commandant," in which deci-
sion on this question may be anticipated. However, the Court of Military
Appeals has already spoken on the matter.
The very first case decided by the Court of Military Appeals in this
area touched on retroactivity, for the Borys court-martial had occurred
before the O'Callahan decision. The court's reversal of Borys was gen-
erally accepted as establishing that military cases which had not become
"final in the sense of Article 76"'11 were still subject to review for com-
pliance with O'Callahan.
In Mercer v. Dillon,'17 the Court expressly addressed the question of
retroactivity. At the outset, citing Borys, Judge Darden, writing for him-
self and Chief Judge Quinn, noted that they had treated O'Callahan as
retrospective as to those cases which were still "subject to direct review"' 8
when it was promulgated. He then discussed at length the previous views
of the Supreme Court as to when retroactivity is and is not required and
justified' 9 and applied these to the situation created by the O'Callahan
14. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 40 C.M.R. 259 (1969); accord, United States v. Prather, 18
U.S.C.MA. 560, 40 C.M.R. 272 (1969).
15. 90 S. Ct. 958 (1970) (No. 665, 1969 Term).
16. 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1964).
17. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 264,41 C.f.R. 264 (1970). See also Gosa v. United States, 19 U.S.C.MA.
327, 41 C.M.R. 327 (1970); Wright v. United States, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 328, 41 C3,.R. 328
(1970); Hooper v. Laird, 19 U.S.C1..A. 329, 41 CAMR. 329 (1970). These latter cases
all followed the rationale of mercer v. Dillion. Judge Ferguson dissented in all except
Hooper v. Laird, where he did not reach the question of retroactivity because he found
service connection based on the facts.
18. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 264, 41 C.M.R. at 264.
19. Id. at 265, citing Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.. 213 (1969); Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293 (1967); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Gosa v. Mayden 305 F. Supp.
1186 (D. Fla. 1969).
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reversal of accepted concepts of court-martial jurisdiction. He concluded
that previous courts-martial had not been categorically unfair-indeed,
many accused had pleaded guilty-and that the armed forces had un-
doubtedly relied on the previous law. Finally, he noted that "a holding
of general retroactivity would place countless convictions for serious
crimes in jeopardy and would often result not in a retrial by a civilian
court but an avoidance of further trial."20 So saying, he denied the pe-
tition for reconsideration of Mercer's conviction and held that O'Callahan
is not retroactive as to cases in which the military appellate process was
complete as of the date the O'Callahan opinion was promulgated.
Judge Ferguson dissented. He first suggested that the Court of Military
Appeals should not have spoken on the question since the Supreme Court
had already agreed to decide Relford. However, he then went on to dis-
cuss the Supreme Court's doctrine of prospective application of consti-
tutional protections. He expressed dislike for the concept and at length
set forth his views that, whether the concept be accepted or not, O'Calla-
han demonstrated that there had never been jurisdiction under the 1950
Uniform Code of Military Justice over non-service-connected offenses. In
consequence, he concluded that Sergeant Mercer's conviction should have
been overturned.2
At this writing, military tribunals are operating under Mercer, in the
understanding that O'Callahan is retroactive as to cases which had not
completed the appellate process prior to its promulgation on June 2, 1969,
but not as to those in which the process had been completed. The first
opportunity for expression of the Supreme Court's views will be Relford.
If it follows Judge Ferguson's view, an incalculable number of offenders
who were convicted of non-service-connected offenses will have claims
for money and other possible relief.
The second question on which the Supreme Court's pronouncements
will be critical is whether that Court will follow the Court of Military
Appeals' decisions as to what offenses are or are not service-connected.
These questions must await a later article. The present discussion will be
confined to the decisions of the Court of Military Appeals, through
March 1970, as to what offenses are service-connected.
II. THE COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS' APPROACH
The basic position of the United States Court of Military Appeals was
established on September 5, 1969, when the majority handed down its
decisions in Borys and United States v. Prather.22 Of these, the Borys
decision was the leading case in which the Court expressed its views at
20. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 264, 41 C.M.R. at 264.
21. Id. at 274, 41 C.M.R. at 274.
22. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 560, 40 C.M.R. 272 (1969).
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length. Like O'Callalhan, it was a sex case, the offenses having been com-
mitted off-base and not otherwise service-connected. Judge Ferguson,
speaking for himself and Judge Darden, followed O'Callahan exactly.
Chief Judge Quinn dissented vigorously. Much of his discussion was in
effect a dissent from the concepts of the O'Callahan decision itself, but
he moved on to distinguish O'Callahan and to find service connection, as
he interpreted the phrase. Further, he interpreted O'Callahan as intended
to oust military jurisdiction only where a federal court would have juris-
diction, not a state court. In Borys, he fully expounded his view of the
limited application of O'Callahan and, in many subsequent dissents, he
has referred to that first opinion as stating the basis for his position in
the later case then under consideration. In the development of the sub-
sequent lines of cases, he has been by far the most liberal in finding ser-
vice connection.
judge Ferguson, on the other hand, has dissented in most cases in
which Chief Judge Quinn and Judge Darden have concurred in holding
that the military has jurisdiction where the offense, although committed
off-base, was consummated at least in part because of the victim's reliance
on the perpetrator's military status. -3 Judge Ferguson has also dissented
vigorously in cases where military jurisdiction has been sustained by the
majority because of the military status of the victim.2 4 It is his position
that a crime committed in the civilian community is a civilian offense,
and that the criminal should not be required to forgo his right to indict-
ment and trial by jury merely because of the military status of either the
criminal or the victim.25 In split decisions in this line of cases, it has gen-
erally been Judge Darden's agreement with the Chief Judge or with
Judge Ferguson which has determined the outcome.
The court, although divided variously depending on the specific factual
situation giving rise to the jurisdictional question, has established a body
of precedent from which there is no reason to expect it to vary sub-
stantially.
A. Overseas Cases
Because of the worldwide locations of U.S. military personnel, one of
the most immediate questions raised by the O'Callahan decision was
23. United States v. Haagenson, 19 U.S.C.,.A. 332, 41 C.M.R. 332 (1970) ; United States
v. Peterson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 319, 41 C1..R. 319 (1970); United States v. Hallahan, 19
U.S.C.MA. 46, 41 CW,.R. 46 (1969) ; United States v. Frazier, 19 U.S.C.A.A. 40, 41 C.Z.R
40 (1969); United States v. Peak, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 19, 41 C.M.R. 19 (1969); United States v.
Morisseau, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 17, 41 C.M.R. 17 (1969).
24. United States v. Plamondon, 19 U.S.C..A. 22, 41 C.3.R. 22 (1969); United States
v. Cook, 19 U.S.C.MA. 13, 41 C.M.R. 13 (1969); United States v. Camacho, 19 U.S.C.MAL
11, 41 C.M.R. 11 (1969); United States v. Rego, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 9, 41 CI.AL. 9 (1969).
25. In this connection, see the discussion of status vis-a-vis service connection in O'Cal-
laban v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 267, 274 (1969).
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whether it applied overseas. If it did have extra-territorial application,
then U.S. servicemen overseas would be amenable to trial only in foreign
tribunals and possible confinement in foreign prisons, because federal
courts have no broad grant of jurisdiction over persons or crimes outside
the United States. If the Supreme Court did intend to divest courts-
martial of jurisdiction overseas in favor of trial by a jury of peers, would
that mean that, in countries where no trial by jury is available, courts-
martial would retain jurisdiction? Or would no one have jurisdiction to
try the offender? Would Status of Forces agreements between the United
States and foreign countries providing for trial of United States service-
men by courts-martial for crimes committed off-base make a difference?
In the first decision of the Court of Military Appeals touching on this
point after O'Callahan, the court found that military courts had juris-
diction over an off-base offense in a "zone of conflict" in Vietnam.20
Judge Ferguson dissented, noting that the offense in question was charged
as possession of counterfeit bills in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472. Ie con-
tended that the accused should have been returned to the United States for
trial by a federal district court.
Thereafter, without dissent, the court has uniformly held that O'Calla-
han has no extra-territorial application, since crimes committed overseas
are not cognizable in state or federal courts and hence trial by court-
martial does not abrogate any right to indictment and trial by jury."
The Supreme Court has not spoken on the question of court-martial
jurisdiction since O'Callahan, but it is interesting to note that this Court
recently refused to consider the petition of an ex-serviceman convicted
by court-martial in Germany for the murder of a German citizen.28 In
that case, the Justice Department urged in its brief, inter alia, that all
crimes committed by servicemen abroad be considered service-connected,
but the Supreme Court's action left this assertion unanswered. Pending
Supreme Court action, it is clear that the Court of Military Appeals con-
siders that courts-martial have jurisdiction over the crimes of servicemen
committed overseas, unless extra-territorial jurisdiction is vested in a
federal civilian court. Meanwhile, the answer to the questions first posed
in this section remain moot, so long as jurisdiction is found to exist over
all offenses committed outside United States territory.
26. United States v. Goldman, 18 U.S.C.I.A. 516, 40 C.M.R. 228 (1969).
27. United States v. Gill, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 93, 41 C.M.R. 93 (1969); United States v.
Higginbotham, 19 U.S.C.MA. 73, 41 C.M.R. 73 (1969); United States v. Stevenson, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 69, 41 CA.R. 69 (1969); United States v. Easter, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 68, 41 C.M.R.
68 (1969); United States v. Keaton, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 64, 41 C.M.R. 64 (1969); United States
v. Weinstein, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 29, 41 C.M.R. 29 (1969).
28. Swift v. Commandant, 396 U.S. 1028 (1970).
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B. On-Base vs. Off-Base Offenses
It is now well established that the Court of Military Appeals will find
that court-martial jurisdiction attaches in all offenses committed by a
serviceman on-base, reasoning that the security of the military installation
is affected thereby.
Thus, in United States v. Fields,9 it was held that the military had
jurisdiction where a serviceman murdered his wife on Schofield Barracks
though federal and local courts had concurrent jurisdiction with the mili-
tary and were available to try him. In other cases, the court held that a
court-martial had jurisdiction over (1) larceny of a civilian-owned vehicle
where the taking occurred on a military reservation, 0 (2) carnal knowl-
edge which took place on a military base, 31 and (3) sodomy which oc-
curred in government quarters on a military installation. 2
When offenses are committed off-base by military personnel, service
connection must be found in some other aspect before courts-martial have
jurisdiction. In Borys and Prather, the court followed O'Callahan in re-
versing convictions where the offenses were committed off-base and no
other service connection was found. Thereafter, the court has reversed
convictions for (1) burglary and larceny off-base though the serviceman
was AWOL from military service at the time,3 3 (2) murder off-base, 4
(3) larceny of a negotiable instrument off-base,33 (4) larceny of a ve-
hicle from an off-base used car lot, even though the vehicle was later
brought on-base,36 and (S) larceny of a vehicle off-base, even though from
a retired army officer while the accused was in uniform and in AWOL
status, having escaped from military confinement.37
The court has clearly made a distinction in line with the rationale of
O'Callahan, between the military stats of the serviceman,38 and the
particular facts and circumstances of his offense. 9 If the facts do not
otherwise establish service connection, his military status will not do so
and a court-martial conviction will be reversed for lack of jurisdiction.
29. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 119, 41 CM.R. 119 (1969).
30. United States v. Paxiao, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 608, 40 C.M.R. 320 (1969).
31. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 609, 40 C.M.R. 321 (1969).
32. United States v. Shockley, 18 US.C.M.A. 610, 40 CIL 322 (1969).
33. United States v. Chandler, 18 US.C.M.A. 593, 40 C.M.R. 305 (1969).
34. United States v. Armstrong, 19 US.C.M.A. 5, 41 C.M.R. 5 (1969).
35. United States v. Safford, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 33, 41 C.M.R. 33 (1969); United States v.
Cochran, 18 U.S.C.A. 588, 40 C.M.R. 300 (1969).
36. United States v. Riehle, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 603, 40 C.M.R. 315 (1969).
37. United States v. Armes, 19 US.C.M.A. 15, 41 C.M.R. 15 (1969). This case is one
of those which confirms the mere fact that an offense committed while in uniform does not
establish service connection.
38. 395 U.S. at 267.
39. Id. at 274.
1970]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38
A particularly difficult problem arises where the criminal and the persons
or property against whom the crime is committed travel between an on-
base and an off-base location. The court has held that jurisdiction did not
attach where a car was stolen off-base and driven to an on-base location,
since the larceny was completed off-base.40 Jurisdiction did not attach
where a serviceman met an under-age female dependent of another ser-
viceman on-base, then accompanied her off-base and engaged in inter-
course with her, since her connection with the service was "natal" only,
and the crime itself was consummated off-base."'
In a robbery prosecution, where a taxi was hired by two servicemen
who hit the driver on the head and mentioned their possession of a pistol
to him while the taxi was still on-base, court-martial jurisdiction was
found even though the extraction of money did not occur until the taxi
had passed into the civilian community.4" The rationale in this case was
that force-and-violence and assault, elements of the offense of robbery,
had taken place within the confines of the military installation.
C. Servicemen as Victims
The Court of Military Appeals has uniformly found sufficient service
connection to sustain court-martial jurisdiction over an offense committed
off-base, where the crime is directed against the person or property of
another serviceman,43 even though the service status of the victim was
unknown to the offender.44
If the crime is directed against a retired serviceman, however, this will
40. United States v. Riehle, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 603, 40 C.M.R. 315 (1969).
41. United States v. Henderson, 18 U.S.C.MA 601, 40 C.M.R. 313 (1969); cf. United
States v. Smith, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 609, 40 C.M.R. 321 (1969), in which the carnal knowledge
of a serviceman's dependent occurred on-base and jurisdiction was confirmed.
42. United States v. Crapo, 18 U.S.C.MA. 594, 40 C.M.R. 306 (1969).
43. Offenses against the person: United States v. Huff, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 56, 41 C.M.R. 56
(1969) (assault); United States v. Nichols, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 43, 41 C.M.R. 43 (1969) (rob-
bery); United States v. Plamondon, 19 U.S.C.MA . 22, 41 C.M.R. 22 (1969) (robbery).
Offenses against property of servicemen: United States v. Cook, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 13, 41
C.M.R. 13 (1969) (larceny of an automobile); United States v. Camacho, 19 U.S.C.M.A.
11, 41 C.M.R. 11 (1969) (housebreaking and larceny); United States v. Rego, 19 U.S.C.M.A.
9, 41 C.M.R. 9 (1969) (housebreaking and larceny). In this regard, see United States v.
O'Callahan, 395 U.S. 258, 270, 274 (1969). The disagreement between the members of the
Court of Military Appeals on the significance of the military status of the victim is well
illustrated by Judge Ferguson's dissent in United States v. Plamondon, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 22,
25, 41 C.M.R. 22, 25 (1969), in which he vigorously criticizes the majority's interpretation
of those two footnotes. A further interesting case, demonstrating how far the majority will
go to find service connection in the status of the victim is United States v. Everson, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 70, 41 C.M.R. 70 (1969). There the accused was charged with the careless dis-
charge of a firearm off-base and it appeared that the bullet struck another serviceman
through sheer misadventure. The court found that this conferred jurisdiction on the court-
martial.
44. See United States v. Camacho, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 11, 41 C.M.R. 11 (1969).
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not confer court-martial jurisdiction; 45 nor will jurisdiction attach
merely by reason of an attack on the persons or property of a service-
man's family.46
D. Reliance on Military Status
There is a line of recent cases in which the Court of Military Appeals
has held that court-martial jurisdiction attaches when the victim is led
to rely on the accused's military status to his detriment. The majority
opinions generally note that the accused's military status was obvious
and emphasized, and that the victim relied at least in part on that status
in (1) permitting the accused to cash a check, 7 (2) charging a large bill
for hotel room, meals and services 4 8 or (3) allowing him to take an auto-
mobile from a used car lot, after discussing its purchase with a salesman
while in uniform, charged as wrongful appropriation based on false pre-
tenses.49
The second of these three cases, United States v. Fryman,50 raises an
interesting point and suggests the possibility of an additional category of
service connection. In that case, the accused used not his own rank but
an assumed one, since he was a Marine Corps private and incurred the
indebtedness while impersonating an officer of the Corps, complete with
insignia, medals, and ribbons. Judge Darden observed:
But in this case we think it is not status alone but the positive misuse of the status
to secure privileges or recognition not accorded others that causes the armed forces
to have a substantial interest in punishing the abuse lest innocent members suffer.51
His discussion of the circumstances raises the possibility that the court
may find service discredit and, hence, service connection in odd circum-
stances which do not necessarily fall under the discrete categories which
we are discussing here.
Judge Ferguson concurred in the result in this case, without explana-
tion, although he had previously dissented in every case wherein the
status of either the offender or his victim was held to establish service
connection. Some light on his reason for concurrence may be drawn from
his previous dissent in United States v. Peak,2 where the accused was
45. United States v. Armes, 19 U.S.C31A. 15, 41 C.M.R. 15 (1969).
46. United States v. McGonigal, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 94, 41 C.,LR. 94 (1969), where the
accused committed sodomy with a female under 16 years of age who was the dependent
of another serviceman. All acts occurred in an off-base dwelling.
47. United States v. Haagenson, 19 U.S.C.M. A. 332, 41 C.MR. 319 (1970) ; United States
v. Frazier, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 40, 41 CLR. 40 (1969) ; United States v. Aorisseau, 19 U.S.C.MI.A.
17, 41 C.M.R. 17 (1969).
48. United States v. Fryman, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 71, 41 CAMR. 71 (1969).
49. United States v. Peak, 19 U.S.C.MA. 19, 41 C.M.R. 19 (1969).
50. 19 U.S.C.MA. 71, 41 C.M.R. 71 (1969).
51. Id. at 73, 41 C.M.R. at 73.
52. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 19, 41 C.M.R. 19 (1969).
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convicted of wrongful appropriation on the basis of false pretenses made
while he was in uniform, and the judge said:
The fact that the accused was in uniform or made representations as to his military
status is simply irrelevant insofar as the wrongful appropriation of this car is con-
cerned. How then can it be said that this is a factor to be considered in determining
the question of jurisdiction.
This was not an offense involving the use or misuse of the uniform, nor was the offense
charged under Article 134... as being "of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces" which might be the case where public confidence in the armed forces is an
element of the offense .... The fact of discredit on the armed forces plays no part
in any criminal conduct, no matter how heinous, except where the offense is properly
chargeable under Article 134.53
In Fryman, the prosecution was brought under Article 134, suggesting
one possible explanation for Judge Ferguson's concurrence.
The court has found military connection in one case where the only evi-
dence of the accused's military status was his military identification,
contained in the endorsement of three checks which he had forged to him-
self as payee.14 The majority reasoned that the victims were made aware
of and relied on the accused's status. Judge Ferguson dissented. He
pointed out that status alone was found insufficient in O'Callahan to sus-
tain military jurisdiction and contended that it was insufficient here. He
reasoned that, regardless of the military status of the accused or the
victim's awareness of it, the crime is essentially one committed in the
civilian community, and is the concern of the individual state.
The most extreme application of this test for jurisdiction based on
reliance on status is found in another recent worthless check case, United
States v. Peterson.5 The checks had been issued by a serviceman to
merchants in the local civilian community. No service identification was
written or hand-printed in the endorsement, as is frequently the case
where such identification is desired or required by the merchant. On the
face of the checks, however, the serviceman's name, service number, and
box number at an air force base were preprinted. Upon non-payment,
the payees complained to the commander of the serviceman's unit. The
majority reasoned that "[t]he fair inference from this evidence is that
each check was accepted by the named payee in reliance upon the ac-
cused's military status."' Judge Ferguson dissented once again, pointing
out that, in his opinion, even the fact that the check was drawn on a
branch bank located on a military base would make no difference, and
that the offenses were "complete" when they were committed off-base.
53. Id. at 21, 41 C.M.R. at 21.
54. United States v. Hallahan, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 46, 41 C.M.R. 46 (1969).
55. 19 U.S.C2..A. 319, 41 C.M.R. 319 (1970).
56. Id. at 321, 41 C.M.R. at 321.
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E. Drug Offenses
The court has been unanimous in holding that the use and the posses-
sion of marihuana and narcotic drugs are offenses having special military
significance sufficient to confer court-martial jurisdiction. The court
considers that use of the substances has disastrous effects on the health
of the user as well as his morale and fitness for military duties, and
hence is to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces.
The court applies the same rationale to the possession of marihuana and
narcotic drugs.
The offense of transfer of marihuana or narcotics has involved an
additional complexity. In United States v. Beeker,8 the court held that
possession and use were service-connected offenses but that, absent other
connection, importation and transportation were not. This holding has
not been disturbed. In United States v. Adams,"" and United States v.
Wysingle,60 however, the court considered the question of the transfer of
marihuana from one serviceman to another without the specific order of
the transferee required by 26 U.S.C. § 4742. In the original decisions on
these two cases, Judge Darden considered that the conviction should be
sustained, finding sufficient service connection and no other prejudicial
error. Judge Ferguson, without finding any difficulty with the service
connection aspect, considered that the conviction was barred by the
much-publicized case of Leary v. United States,0l on the ground that the
Marihuana Tax Act62 compelled the accused to "expose himself to a
'real and appreciable' risk of self-incrimination."' ' Chief Judge Quinn,
on the other hand, found that reversal was required because the prose-
cution was based upon the first or second provisions of Article 134," de-
nouncing conduct "to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the
armed forces" and "of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces,"
respectively. Indeed, it appears that he concluded that service connection
57. United States v. Wysingle, 19 US.C.M.A. 81, 41 CI.R. 81 (1969), reconsidered, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 263, 41 CW.MR. 263 (1970); United States v. Adams, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 81, 41
C.M.RL 81 (1969), reconsidered, 19 US.C.M.A. 262, 41 C.M.R. 262 (1970); United States
v. Rose, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 41 C.M.R. 3 (1969); United States v. Castro, 18 US.C.M.A.
598, 40 C.M.R. 310 (1969); United States v. DeRonde, 18 US.C.M.A. 575, 40 C.M.R. 287
(1969); United States v. Beeker, 18 US.C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969).
58. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969).
59. 19 U.S.C.MA. 75, 41 C.M.R. 75 (1969), reconsidered, 19 US.C.M.A. 262, 41 C.M.R.
262 (1970).
60. 19 US.C.M.A. 81, 41 C.M.R. 81 (1969), reconsidered, 19 US.C.A. 263, 41 CM.R.
263 (1970).
61. 395 US. 6 (1969).
62. 26 U.S.C. § 4741 et seq. (1964).
63. 395 U.S. at 16, quoted in 19 US.C.M.A. at 80, 41 C.M.R. at 80.
64. 10 US.C. § 934 (1964).
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under Beeker was conditioned upon the prosecution falling under one
of those two provisions. In consequence, he found prejudicial error in
that the law officer had failed to instruct the court-martial on the ne-
cessity that they find the conduct to be prejudicial to good order and
discipline or service-discrediting, a required instruction in such cases
pursuant to a long line of the court's decisions. 6
Following the initial decisions in Adams and in Wysingle, the Supreme
Court handed down the decision in Minor v. United States,0 which held
that the rationale of Leary did not protect the transferor of marihuana.
Following this, upon motions for reconsideration by the government,
Judge Ferguson reversed his position in Adams and Wysingle, although
Chief Judge Quinn adhered to his conclusion that the convictions in the
two cases must be reversed because of the instructional problem. In
sum, the rule of the court is now that transfer of marihuana to another
serviceman without compliance with 26 U.S.C. § 4742 is a service-con-
nected offense.
F. Military Offenses
In no case has it been contended that a court-martial would not have
jurisdiction to try a purely military offense such as absence without
leave or disobedience of a lawful order. Such offenses have no counterpart
in civilian life, and are creatures of statute designed solely for the main-
tenance of order and discipline in the military services.
While violations of orders and regulations may generally be considered
to be service-connected, in United States v. Castro7 judge Ferguson ex-
pressed the view that the conduct proscribed in a regulation must be
service-connected, lest the power to issue regulations extend military
jurisdiction beyond that delimited in O'Callakan. On this basis, he held
that an order forbidding possession of barbiturates, amphetamines, and
other dangerous drugs covered service-connected conduct and a violation
was triable by court-martial, but off-base violation of a regulation prohib-
iting the carrying of concealed weapons was not. Chief Judge Quinn dis-
sented as to the latter point, on the ground that carrying a concealed
65. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 76-77, 41 C.M.R. at 76-77, citing United States v. Williams, 8
U.S.C.M.A. 325, 327, 24 C.M.R. 135, 137 (1957). Judges Darden and Ferguson concluded
that the prosecution was under the third provision of Article 134, denouncing "crimes and
offenses not capital," so that they found no need for this instruction.
66. 396 U.S. 87 (1969). In the advance copies of the reconsideration decision in United
States v. Adams, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 75, 41 C.M.R. 75 (1969), the Court of Military Appeals
cites this as Buie v. United States, the style of a companion case covered by the same de-
cision. This will be changed in the bound volumes of the Reports.
67. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 598, 40 C.M.R. 310 (1969).
68. Id. at 601, 40 CM.R. at 61, citing United States v. Tobin, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 625, 631,
38 C.M.R. 423, 429 (1968).
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weapon constituted conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline
without regard to local law,68 but Judge Ferguson's limitation on prose-
cutions for violations of regulations effectively curtails the application
of Article 92(1) and, almost certainly, of Articles 90(2), 91(2), and
92(2) as well.69
An interesting question presents itself with regard to such crimes as
treason and espionage. When these are committed by a serviceman, they
certainly affect the security of the nation, its government and all of its
people. The Court of Military Appeals has held that, where a service-
man conspired to pass documents containing military information to a
foreign power and where his military duties played a major part in his
ability to obtain the documents, there was sufficient service connection
to establish jurisdiction in a court-martial even though the crime was
cognizable in the federal courts.70
G. Petty Offenses
The rationale for O'Callaan was that persons tried by court-martial
are denied their constitutional right to indictment and trial by jury. In
other decisions, the Supreme Court has held that an accused is not con-
stitutionally entitled to indictment or trial by jury for petty offenses71
and that offenses punishable by penalties of up to six months' imprison-
ment do not require trial by jury. 2
Following this line of reasoning, the Court of Military Appeals has
held that a serviceman who was drunk and disorderly in uniform off-base
is triable by court-martial, since the maximum punishment is six months'
confinement at hard labor and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month
for a like period. The court observed that the accused lost no constitu-
tional right through trial by court-martial, since he would not be entitled
to indictment and trial by jury in the civilian community.a
The Chief Judge concurred in the result, but arrived at his opinion
by a different route. He cited his dissent in United States v. Armes,74
where he stated his opinion that offenses committed while the offender
is in uniform are triable by courts-martial. In support of his opinion, the
Chief judge pointed out that Congress has considered the wearing of
the uniform such a manifest and significant circumstance of military
69. These statutes, respectively 10 U.S.C. §§ 890(2), 891(2), 892(1), 892(2) (1964),
comprise all of the Articles which denounce violations of various classes of orders and reg-
ulations.
70. United States v. Safford, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 33, 41 C.M.R. 33 (1969); United States
v. Harris, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 596, 40 C.M.R. 308 (1969).
71. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (dictum); District of Columbia v. Clawans,
300 U.S. 617 (1937).
72. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
73. United States v. Sharkey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 26, 41 C.M.R. 26 (1969).
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association that it has forbidden the wearing of it or any distinctive part
of it without authority." He then pointed to the observation in O'Calla-
han, inter alia, that the accused was wearing civilian clothes and deduced
that the wearing of the uniform while committing a crime, together with
the resulting discredit to the armed forces, is sufficient service con-
nection to establish the jurisdiction of a court-martial to try the accused.
So far, United States v. Sharkey 6 stands alone in excepting petty
offenses from the O'Callahan rule. It dealt only with drunk and dis-
orderly conduct, and obviously covers the lesser offenses of drunkenness
under service discrediting circumstances and of disorderly conduct. There
are a very few other offenses which courts-martial have considered in
the past and which may be categorized as similarly petty, based on the
authorized maximum punishment. This basis for jurisdiction may be
extended to them in the future.
III. CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, it may be seen that a list of criteria for the ex-
ercise of court-martial jurisdiction may be derived which is somewhat
parallel to the points which Justice Douglas noted in O'Callahan, as
first listed above. That is, that peacetime jurisdiction will exist if any
one or more of the following apply:
1. Offense committed outside United States territory.
2. Offense committed on a military installation.
3. An active duty serviceman as victim.
4. Reliance of the victim on the accused's military status.
5. Possession or use of drugs or marihuana (including unauthorized
transfer to a serviceman).
6. Military offenses (e.g., AWOL, desertion, disobedience).
7. Petty offenses.
Of course, no opportunity has arisen for testing the significance of
martial law or of a formally declared "time of war." Whether other
circumstances may be added to this list, as a basis for peacetime juris-
diction, remains to be seen, but it may be anticipated that they will be
few, infrequently found, and applicable to rare cases." Experience with
the flow of court-martial cases strongly suggests that the categories above
will comprise by far the most significant bases for the exercise of juris-
diction under O'Callahan. Always, of course, with the caveat that this
body of law, developed by the Court of Military Appeals, still awaits
the imprimatur of the Supreme Court.
74. 19 U.S.C.MA. 15, 41 Cd.MR. 15 (1969).
75. United States v. Sharkey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 26, 28, 41 CM.R. 26, 28 (1969); see 18
U.S.C. § 702 (1964).
76. 19 U.S.C.MA. 26, 41 C.M.R. 26 (1969).
77. See the discussion of United States v. Fryman, text accompanying note 50, supra.
